Ethical Issues of the Case: Points for Discussion (continued)
Vandivier's technical expertise remains a problem. As revealed in the Congressional Hearing, and as pointed out by Fielder, Vandivier did not even complete his high school education, even though he testified that he had. His technical expertise is questionable, and his charges are based on second-hand information. In addition, a boilerplate format was used for all qualification reports, so Vandivier did not need much in the way of technical know-how for report completion. He simply fulfilled a cost-effective clerical role in the Goodrich operation.
When Proxmire asked Vandivier if this kind of thing had ever happened before — that is, had any other technical writer for Goodrich been asked to falsify documentation — Vandivier said that, to his knowledge, this was the first time. And when Proxmire questioned him on the usual practice regarding discrepancies in testing, how Goodrich normally handled such situations, Vandivier revealed that if there were deviations in testing procedures, Goodrich put those deviations in writing and usually a compromise was reached with the contractor.
Vandivier worked at Goodrich for six years: three as an instrumentation technician, and the last three as a technical writer. On whose technical authority did Vandivier base his falsification argument? It was Lawson; however, Lawson had just graduated and was working under a designer whose specialization was the aircraft brake. Lawson had theoretical knowledge, but lacked practical experience. In addition, there were at least 30 other professionals on staff during the qualifying tests. Why was there only one person (a technical writer) willing to come forward, and only one other (an inexperienced engineer) willing to give a halfhearted corroboration of the charges?
When Proxmire questioned Lawson about the falsification of the report he prepared with Vandivier, Lawson's statement was less than accusatory. In retrospect, Lawson states that he was naive about government contracting in particular, but also about aircraft brake testing in general. He had theoretical training, but was unfamiliar with the work in practice. For example, he notes that all brakes glow a bright cherry red under similar testing, but he did not know that at the time. When he perceived intentional deception on Sink's part, he panicked, and mistrusted the advice of most of the experts around him. In addition, he feels that, had he known the procedures better, he could have advised them that the four-rotor brake would have worked. This assumes, however, that other Goodrich personnel would have been straightforward about the limitations of the new technology. Receiving the benefit of increased payload meant that the four-rotor brake would have worn out sooner. It might have stopped 300 instead of 400 times (as set out in the specifications). With that knowledge, all concerned could have accessed information necessary for making a more informed decision about whether the benefits of the four-rotor brake outweighed its drawbacks.
Another former Goodrich researcher contends that, in 1967, the design engineers — specifically Warren — thought they possessed the necessary technical knowledge. Brake engineering specialists at that time decided that what they deemed a small deviation in temperature was of little consequence, and because military specifications were unrealistic for the innovative four-rotor brake, they took greater liberty with engineering interpretation. As evidenced by Congressional Hearing testimony, neither Vandivier nor Lawson were aware of the extent to which specialists accommodated such procedural guidelines, until, of course, the four-rotor brake forced the issue.
At bottom, the erroneous qualification testing procedure is the most troubling point of the case. Testing procedures were lax because of faith in proven technologies and professional trust. While the procedures were discussed in the Congressional Hearing, the issue disappeared, and was not of paramount concern to either Proxmire or to others involved in the case. But what would have happened if the problems with qualification testing and reporting procedures had become politicized? Would all involved in the aircraft brake industry be forced to reconcile their qualification testing procedures because someone at Goodrich covered up a mistake using engineering rationalization and loose qualification testing procedures as an excuse?
Members of the Goodrich staff did not present an honest picture of what the four-rotor brake's limitations were. But the Congressional Hearing testimony also shows that those involved (from government procurement officials through subcontractors like Goodrich) were comfortable modifying reports so that their brakes would meet the requirements laid out by the military specifications.
Thus, beyond technological and communication problems, the evidence supplied at the Congressional Hearing make testing verification procedures appear somewhat ludicrous. Written sign-off meant virtually nothing, and attendance at crucial test points seemed arbitrary and optional. Conable asked Lawson what a qualifying report meant — was it production ready, or test ready? Lawson stated that it meant the brake was qualified for flight testing only, that it had to pass flight testing before a production brake was made for airplanes. When asked what Goodrich gained by falsifying data, Lawson stated that he felt Goodrich could gain nothing, that it was a case of certain individuals' pride, and that upper management had no idea what was going on.
There were no clearly defined levels of accountability for the project. Lines of responsibility were blurred such that everyone's vision of the project became microscopic; hence, no one saw the aggregate implications of the A7D brake. In addition, testing procedures were no longer adequate (note: inadequate, not illegal) for meeting the challenges of innovation. But were they ethical, especially regarding the qualification testing? And who is culpable for letting such misleading qualification testing procedures persist?
Procedures were put in place because, in essence, no one ever expected that an innovative brake would cause such a stir. This meant that those involved with the A7D could act out the qualification testing masquerade; hence, all involved were carrying out improper testing procedures to some degree, and this was specified by government expectations and advanced by standard industry practice. Yet, if a certain amount of engineering interpretation is required or expected in meeting contracting specifications, and if these rules are implicitly understood throughout an industry, what would constitute a "falsified" report? This was certainly a concern at the time.
This raises serious questions about the qualification testing procedures as written and enforced, both during the A7D aircraft brake project and now — questions students of engineering and business ethics must tussle with. How do we reconcile innovation with meeting paradoxical testing procedures? What are the ethical implications of a procedure that forces people to compromise their professional standards from the onset? And, if government officials writing specifications are not specialists, who advises them? The same people who must, in turn, meet the specifications?
With each increase in engineering and technological sophistication, new problems arise, and new traps lay just beneath the surface. Perhaps the most valuable lesson of the case is that we all need to think about whether current industry practice can meet the challenges new technologies bring. And engineers and managers must be encouraged to admit when innovation falls short of its promise. There will always be risk in innovation. The trick is learning how best to minimize it.
Annotated Bibliography
The Goodrich Case: Primary Sources
Vandivier, Kermit. "Why Should My Conscience Bother Me?" in Heilbroner, Robert L. (ed.), In the Name of Profit. Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972. Pp. 3–31. See also the reprint of this article, "The Aircraft Brake Scandal," Harper's Magazine, 244 (April 1972), pp. 45–52.
Vandivier, as whistle-blower at B.F. Goodrich, presented his side of the incident in this well-crafted account. The self-proclaimed ethical actor in the case, Vandivier skillfully caricatured the other central actors in the case, detailing how events at B.F. Goodrich lead inevitably to his blowing the whistle on unethical conduct surrounding qualification testing and reporting falsification at the Troy, Ohio Wheel and Brake Plant. As one of the most famous cases in the literature of whistle-blowing, Vandivier's narrative is held as a paradigm example of one courageous individual challenging corporate corruption, and his account went unchallenged for nearly 20 years.
Air Force A7-D Brake Problem: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Ninety-First Congress, First Session, August 13, 1969. LC card 72-606996.
As the only other available primary evidence for the Goodrich case, this four-hour Congressional Hearing presents testimony from the other key actors in the brake problem incident: from Vandivier and his corroborator, Lawson, to representatives of the Air Force, Government Accounting Office (GAO) and B.F. Goodrich Co. headquarters in Akron, Ohio. The Hearing also contains the original, "falsified" qualification report (Q6031) as well as the inquiry into the Air Force A7-D brake problem. The Hearing was chaired by Senator Proxmire, the quality assurance senator, now notorious for his "Golden Fleece Awards," handed out monthly from 1975–1980 to federal government agencies deemed most wasteful, nay reckless, in their disbursement of the taxpayers' dollars. The purpose of the Hearing was to determine: (1) the accuracy of B.F. Goodrich's reported qualification test results; (2) the effect the defective brakes had on the test pilot's safety; (3) the identification of additional costs, if any, incurred by the Government to obtain an acceptable brake; and (4) the responsibilities of the Government, including Air Force actions, in the qualification testing. The Hearing revealed problems not only with Goodrich's qualification testing and reporting procedures, but with the aircraft brake industry's procedures as a whole.
The Goodrich Case: Secondary Sources
Fielder, John H. "Give Goodrich a Break." Business and Professional Ethics Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 1988).
Fielder's article challenges the original assumptions of the Goodrich case, noting that Vandivier overstated the case of pilot safety. In addition, he questions why those teaching business and professional ethics courses, as well as those engaged in scholarly writing on whistle-blowing, have treated the case solely on Vandivier's version. He questions whether we have been presenting and spreading a one-sided account that is also unfair. Fielder addresses: 1) whether Vandivier's moral judgments about Goodrich were accurate and fair; 2) how academic writers have used Vandivier's version of events to attack Goodrich; and 3) why writers have uncritically accepted Vandivier's account. He concludes that it is because "...it so clearly fits a concept of corporate wrongdoing and individual courage that fairly obvious signs that something is wrong have been overlooked." Based on the ambiguities of the case, he questions whether it is truly useful as an applied ethics case, noting that it can certainly no longer be used as a paradigm example of morally justified whistle-blowing.
Wills, Jocelyn A. "Tough Brake For Goodrich: Qualifying the Ethical Issue." Paper presented at the 1992 Phi Alpha Theta Southwest Region Historical Conference, Texas A&M University, April 1992. (Manuscript under review by the Business and Professional Ethics Journal.)
Wills takes Fielder's article as her lead, and uses the Congressional Hearing and personal interviews to argue that the central ethical issue of the case pivots around problems associated with qualification testing procedures and aircraft brake industry practice. She concludes that: "A careful reading of the historical evidence shows that whistle-blowing was merely a symptom of larger ethical dilemmas within both Goodrich and the aircraft brake industry as a whole from engineering responsibility regarding rationalizing ineptitude and failed innovation, to the case actors' accountability for deficiencies in communications, to governmental and industry culpability in allowing erroneous qualification testing procedures to continue." Unlike Fielder, she argues that the Goodrich case remains useful for those studying applied ethics precisely because of its ambiguities and social/economic/political layers.
The Whistle-blowing Debate
De George, Richard T. Business Ethics. New York: Macmillan Press, 1982. P. 161.
De George makes the distinction between when whistle-blowing is morally permissible and when it is obligatory. His criteria are that: 1) the company must be engaged in a practice or about to release a product that does serious harm to individuals or to society in general; and the more serious the harm, the greater the obligation; 2) the employee should report his or her concern or complaint to his or her immediate superior; 3) if no appropriate action is taken, the employee should take the matter up the managerial line (before he or she is obliged to go public, the resources for remedy within the company should be exhausted); 4) the employee should have documentation of the practice or defect. "Without adequate evidence his chances of being successful... are slim"; and 5) the employee must have good reason to believe that, by going public, he or she will be able to bring about the necessary changes. According to his argument, the first three of his criteria must be met for whistle-blowing to be permissible, that engineers should, whenever possible, avoid putting their jobs in jeopardy because of their personal convictions.
James, Gene G. "In Defense of Whistle Blowing." Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate Morality. Hoffman, Michael W. and Jennifer Moore, eds. 1984. Pp. 315–322.
James challenges De George's views, arguing that engineers are obligated to reveal wrongdoing they are unable to prevent, because they have a duty to protect the safety and well-being of others. He offers practical considerations that can be used in deciding whether or not to blow the whistle on perceived ethical misconduct.
Baron, Marcia. The Moral Status of Loyalty. Module Series in Applied Ethics from the Center for Studies of Ethics in the Professions, Illinois Institute of Technology, 1984.
Baron's discussion focuses on what, if anything, is good about loyalty to a corporation, and how do we decide under what circumstances it is better to be disloyal. She concludes that claims to loyalty, be they from a corporation, family, or friends, must be overridden in one's duty to uphold justice.
Goldberg, David Theo. "Tuning Into Whistle-blowing." Business and Professional Ethics Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer 1988).
Using the Challenger disaster as his focus, David Goldberg disputes De George's distinctions between obligatory and permissible whistle-blowing, stating that when the consequences of whistle-blowing benefit the public at large, other considerations must be subordinated. He further argues that the only way we can often prevent further incidents is to expose current ethical misconduct.
Davis, Michael. "Avoiding the Tragedy of Whistle-Blowing." Business and Professional Ethics Journal, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer 1988), pp. 3-19.
Michael Davis argues that whistle-blowing need not be an inevitable outcome of ethical misconduct, and that it should be avoided at all cost because its only real worth is as a necessary evil. He sees whistle-blowing as a tragic no-win situation, and argues that individuals should use formal as well as informal networks. If organizational settings encouraged individuals to be the bearers of bad news and opened their lines of communications, the tragedy of whistle-blowing could be avoided.
"Thinking Like An Engineer: The Place of a Code of Ethics in the Practice of a Profession." Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 150–167.
In this lucid essay, Davis argues that "a code of professional ethics is central to advising individual engineers how to conduct themselves, to judging their conduct, and ultimately to understanding engineering as a profession." Using the now-infamous Challenger disaster as his model, Davis discusses both the evolution of engineering ethics as well as why engineers should obey their professional codes of ethics, from both a pragmatic and an ethically responsible point of view. A must-read for any graduating engineering student.
Dandekar, Natalie. "Can Whistle-Blowing Be FULLY Legitimized? A Theoretical Discussion," Business and Professional Ethics Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 1991, pp. 89-108.
Natalie Dandekar builds on Michael Davis' themes, and stresses the need for legislative and educational reforms to protect those who find themselves in those rare cases where they have a legitimate claim to justifiable whistle-blowing