Background
Company history
The Aircraft Brake Scandal pivots on problems associated with technological innovation. In 1945, B.F. Goodrich installed a Wheel and Brake Plant in Troy, Ohio, a typical small (population approximately 15,000 in 1960) company town. Hobart Industries was Troy's dominant enterprise, and Goodrich ranked Troy's fourth largest employer. A medium-sized firm, Goodrich had an informal setting and everyone was on familiar terms with their coworkers.
As a subsidiary of the B.F. Goodrich Company, headquartered in Akron, Ohio, the plant took over the pioneering aviation operations of the Waco Plane Company, building World War II troop gliders for the Air Force. The aerospace industry represented a fraction of Goodrich's business (approximately five percent), and while contracting work meant that many projects were underway at once, aircraft brakes were based on straightforward electromechanical technology and most innovations were elementary. Thus, for its first 20 years, most Troy Plant employees were trained in two-year colleges or on the floor. While a managerial hierarchy existed, no formal channels of communication were in place. As a small operation, employing 600 people (200 of whom were salaried professionals), there was little need for such elaborate procedures.
In the early 1960s, disc brakes replaced brake drums. The need for more sophisticated engineering became evident at Goodrich, and many of the Plant's earlier positions were eliminated. For example, with a background in electronics, Vandivier's expertise as an instrumentation technician was no longer part of Goodrich's vital operations; therefore, in 1965 he was reassigned as a technical writer. Other Goodrich employees had similar experiences. Degreed engineers were hired for meeting the needs of new technologies and governmental contracting requirements. Despite Goodrich's small operation, their new, more sophisticated labor pool established a reputation for providing excellent brakes for both military and civilian aircraft. Thus, Goodrich became a strong competitor for the A7D aircraft brake contract.
The LTV contract
On June 18, 1967, the Goodrich Troy Plant received Purchase Order P237138 from the Ling-Temco Vought (LTV) Co. of Dallas, Texas, contracting for 202 brake assemblies for the new A7D light attack aircraft. While built for the Navy, the A7D light attack bomber was procured by the Air Force; hence, the A7D was a joint Navy/Air Force program. LTV was awarded the prime contract for the A7D, and was responsible for subcontracting to other specialists in the aircraft industry. LTV received four quotes from top specialists in the brake field: Goodrich, Bendix Aviation Products Division, General Tire and Rubber Co., and Goodyear Aviation Products Division. LTV awarded Goodrich the contract based on Goodrich's competitive bid and, more importantly, their innovative technical design (that is, Goodrich was introducing a lightweight four-rotor brake).
Once discs replaced drums, the industry standard for Air Force aircraft brakes was based on a heavier five-rotor model. Because the design of the aircraft disc brake is very tough technically, and costs associated with improving it often outweigh the benefits from so doing, there was little innovation in the aircraft brake industry through the 1960s. Thus, Goodrich's proposed lighter-weight, four-rotor brake was considered state-of-the-art design in a relatively static industry. Goodrich's innovative brake design meant that the A7D light attack aircraft could carry a heavier payload (that is, munitions). Considering the cost and payload advantages, both the US Navy and Air Force supported the LTV decision, and Goodrich was awarded the A7D contract.
QA procedures
Standard governmental qualification testing specifications and procedures were written with the five-rotor brake in mind. Qualification testing specifications were written by specialists in the aircraft brake industry, and procedures ensured that any properly designed five-rotor brake could meet, with some engineering discretion, testing qualifications to the letter of the government's specifications. With the five-rotor precedent as their guide, both the government and LTV specification documents (Military Spec MilW5013GUS Air Force and LTV Specification Document 2041637D) adopted these long-held, five-rotor standards for the Goodrich four-rotor brake. Meeting specifications was not difficult, and when brakes did not meet the intent of the specifications, compromise was commonplace. The subcontractor had license to modify procedures as necessary, provided they kept the prime contractor apprised of adjustments or problems.
A common understanding developed over time between those working within the brake industry. And while rules were not meant for breaking per se, trust was cultivated between the various specialists. With professional understandings between prime contractor LTV and subcontractor Goodrich in place, LTV set the last two weeks of June 1968 aside for flight testing. This gave Goodrich almost one full year for designing and testing the four-rotor brake.
Brake development
John Warren, one of Goodrich's best engineers, designed the initial A7D four-rotor brake. In his early 30s, Warren had an excellent track record in aircraft brake design. He was involved in notable designs, including the Air Force C5A brake contracted to Lockheed and General Electric, as well as the Boeing 727 brake. After he had completed the design, Warren handed off the brake so that he could work on the many other brake projects in progress at the Troy Plant.
Searle Lawson, a young and recent aeronautical and astronautical college graduate, was assigned the task of testing brake lining temperatures in Warren's design prior to building the final prototype of the A7D brake. This was Lawson's first real job working on brakes. Through March of 1968, he built and tested sundry prototypes so that appropriate lining materials could be chosen. During Lawson's laboratory test stops, however, he was alarmed by the brake's high temperature reading, as well as the fact that it glowed a bright cherry-red and threw off sparks.
Following several simulated landings, Lawson examined the linings and noticed that they had disintegrated. In December of 1967, a full six months into the project, Lawson realized that the A7D brake had a fundamental design flaw. From his training, Lawson understood the brake was too small and could not withstand the demands of a normal aircraft landing. "The brake would not make the required number of stops as far as [specification requirements for the] life of the brake [were concerned]. It just would not make it."
Lawson reported his findings to the design engineer, Warren, who assured him it was not a design problem. Warren said the four-rotor brake design was neither too small nor in need of more material, and he instructed Lawson to try still other lining materials. Lawson then spent much of his time in Cleveland, learning about lining materials. Trying countless materials, he continued testing the brake, but the results were always the same: the Goodrich brake could not meet the Air Force and LTV specification requirements without "nursing" the brake through the various tests.
Warren was busy with other projects in the plant, and had disassociated himself from the A7D brake. He did not advocate misrepresenting the A7D brake; he just no longer wanted a role in the A7D because his project segment was complete. Thus, as engineer responsible for testing the brake, the A7D was now Lawson's exclusive domain. Unable to discuss the possible implications of the overzealous goals of the four-rotor brake with Warren, and deciding he was still not satisfied with the designer's recommendations, Lawson took his concerns to his immediate supervisor, Robert L. Sink, Goodrich A7D project manager. Sink told Lawson to keep testing different materials, noting that he had already assured LTV several times that the brake design was a success, and that Warren's design would work. Sink further reminded Lawson that if the design did prove faulty, Sink would answer to Goodrich executives and LTV.
Parts began arriving at the plant and, over the next few months, a working model was built so that full qualification tests could begin. By late March, 1968, Goodrich attempted qualifying the brake by military specifications 12 times, and each time the brake failed the specified temperature tests. At the same time, Sink continued assuring LTV that brake tests were going smoothly. As far as Lawson was concerned, however, Warren's innovative design was a dismal failure, and the June flight testing dates were fast approaching.
Kermit Vandivier's role
On April 4, 1968, the 13th qualifying attempt was made, but again, without nursing the four-rotor brake, Goodrich qualification testing was unsuccessful. In fact, Goodrich personnel set up special cooling fans in the testing laboratory both to avoid problems with lining material and to meet the specifications. On April 11, 1968, after a full year of brake qualifying tests, Kermit Vandivier found himself involved in the A7D operation when he discovered many discrepancies between the military specifications and the qualification tests carried out at Goodrich.
Vandivier was then a technical writer for Goodrich. He had worked for the company for six years, the first three as an instrumentation technician, and his last three as a writer. As low man on the Goodrich totem pole, the major component of Vandivier's work involved reading numbers off the testing strip chart, and plotting the curves for inclusion in qualification reports. The writing task was routine, and a boilerplate format was used. Although a time-consuming effort, it did not require an engineer's expertise. After plotting the engineering curves, Vandivier wrote the appropriate documentation that would accompany the testing data in the qualification report.
On seeing the discrepancies between the military specifications and the Goodrich four-rotor brake test results, Vandivier questioned whether he should compose a report that was so out of step. While not formally trained, Vandivier had worked as official scribe on enough Goodrich reports to feel something was awry in this particular case."All of these incidents were in clear violation of military specifications and general industry practice."
Vandivier took his concerns to his immediate supervisor, Ralph Gretzinger, Test Lab Supervisor, who assured him that the testing laboratory would not issue a misrepresentation of the qualification tests. However, virtually every entry in this so-called copy of the test logs was drastically altered. As an example, the stop time for the worn brake maximum energy stop was changed from 141 seconds to a mere 46.8 seconds. Within a few days, a typewritten copy of the test logs of test T1867 [the 13th attempt] was sent to LTV in order to assure LTV that a qualified brake was almost ready for delivery.
On hearing of the interim report, Vandivier questioned Richard Gloor, test laboratory engineer, who told him that Lawson had directed the test lab to miscalibrate the instruments, at the order of one of Lawson's superiors. When Vandivier approached Lawson about qualification test T-1867, Lawson confirmed Gloor's account. Lawson told Vandivier that they were going to make a 14th attempt at qualifying the brake; however, that Robert Sink, A7D project manager (Lawson's immediate supervisor), and Russell Van Horn, manager of the Aircraft Wheel and Brake Design section, had told Lawson that, "Regardless of what the brake does on the [14th] test [conducted in May, 1968], we are going to qualify it," and that, if the 14th test failed, the report would be written based on test T1867.
That said, Sink left for California on Troy Plant business. In his absence, Sink left Warren in charge of the A7D, but Warren was busy working on other design-related projects, and had little time available for helping Lawson.
On May 2, 1968, the 14th attempt at qualifying the brake was made. The brake was nursed along, and little lining was left after the 45 simulated stops. While the tests were conducted, Lawson asked Vandivier to commence writing the qualification report. Vandivier was incensed and refused to write a qualification report that he felt was based on falsified data. At first, Gretzinger backed Vandivier's decision. He said he would approach his own supervisor, Russell Line, Manager of the technical services section, and get the matter cleared up. "He consulted Mr. Line and assured me that both had concurred in the decision not to write a qualification report."
Meanwhile, on return from California, Sink told Lawson to start writing the report, and then Sink again left Troy on Goodrich business. When Lawson told Vandivier his predicament, Vandivier offered to help gather the test data.
By the end of May, 1968, Vandivier and Lawson completed the graphic portion of Qualification Report Q603139, and discussed the implications of what they were doing. Vandivier was so concerned about the implications of a falsified report that he even went above his own immediate supervisor to discuss the matter with Line. In many companies today, never mind in a company operating in 1968, his was a pretty daring move. Goodrich had not yet developed procedures for problems like the one Vandivier found himself embroiled in; thus, going over his immediate supervisor and sidestepping discussions with Sink (because he was out of town) meant that Vandivier had already started the whistle-blowing process.
Having taken his concerns to everyone but the chief engineer, Bud Sunderman, and having the graphic portion of the report complete, Vandivier felt his involvement in Qualification Report Q6031 was at an end. This was not his fortune, however, and despite Vandivier's efforts to avoid writing the narrative portion of the report, Gretzinger told him he had no choice.
Goodrich submitted Qualification Report Q6031 to LTV on June 12, 1968, without either Vandivier or Lawson notifying Sunderman or Goodrich corporate headquarters in Akron of their misgivings. Lawson's testimony at the Congressional Hearing helps explain why this was so. "I really didn't feel there was anybody above [Sink] that I could take it to."